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  The German sociologist Max Weber believed that modern state administration embodies instrumental rationality,
defined as the pursuit of explicit ends through efficient means. [FN1]  *2 When we peer over the sheer wall of an
enormous dam or look up at a battleship bristling with sailors, the power of state bureaucracy awes us much like it
awed Weber.  In contrast, another famous German writer, Franz Kafka, described state administration as a labyrinth
where condemned citizens wander without hope of escape. [FN2]  Kafka apparently believed that bureaucratic
government embodies irrationality, defined as the pursuit of contradictory ends by inefficient means.  When the state
constructs unneeded dams to enrich cement manufacturers and dispatches battleships to perform tasks requiring a
rowboat, the irrationality of state bureaucracy appalls us much like it appalled Kafka.
  What determines whether state law is rational and efficient, or irrational and inefficient?  State organizations suffer
from agency problems that preclude effective motivation of people by formal means alone.  Perhaps effective formal
institutions depend on flourishing informal institutions.  With these thoughts in mind, political scientists have
examined civic culture, [FN3] economists have examined social capital, [FN4] and legal scholars have examined
social norms. [FN5]  At stake in research on informal institutions is a vision of the proper role of the state in modern
society.  With the collapse of communism and retreat of socialism, most people have lost faith in centralized
planning as a method for making commodities.  Centralized planning, however, is a way of making *3 la s as well
as commodities.  Skepticism toward one should extend to the other.  Research on norms might provide ideas needed
to revitalize decentralized lawmaking.
  To clarify this debate, I will distinguish three effects of social norms on law: expression, internalization, and
deterrence.  These three effects relate to three functions of a law: pronouncing the obligation, justifying it, and
sanctioning wrongdoers.  I analyze the powerful synergies created by aligning law with morality, which make social
control effective.
  I begin with some examples that I will use throughout the paper.
    Example 1: divorce lawyers--Five lawyers in a town handle most divorces.  Four of the lawyers typically induce
their clients to settle out of court, whereas the fifth lawyer typically litigates.  Most lawyers in the town shun the
litigious lawyer. [FN6]
  Who will make more money, the four "respectable" lawyers or the  "disrespectable" lawyer?  I will use Example 1
to illustrate the effect of non- legal sanctions on competition for income and prestige.
    Example 2: hostile takeovers--Lawyers in established firms initially refuse to organize hostile takeovers.  After
one firm breaks ranks and organizes hostile takeovers, almost all law firms begin to organize hostile takeovers.
[FN7]
  When do social norms collapse?  I will use Example 2 to illustrate instability in social norms.
    Example 3: liability--The defendant's negligence caused a loss of $100 to the plaintiff without harming anyone
else.  The court holds the defendant liable for $100.  Upon learning of the court's decision, citizens boycott the
defendant's business and cause a loss of $25.
  Should the court have anticipated the social sanction and reduced the judgment to $75?  I will use Example 3 to
discuss the effect of non-legal sanctions on legal sanctions.
    Example 4: smoking--Smoking, which was common in an airport terminal, disappears after the authorities post
signs prohibiting it.  No police or other officials enforce the ban.
  *4 How can law change behavior without deterring anyone?  I will use Example 4 to illustrate the expressive
power of law.
    Example 5: pooper-scooper--When authorities post signs requiring owners to clean up after their dogs, sidewalks
become cleaner, although the mess from dogs does not disappear completely.  No police or other officials enforce
the obligation on dog owners.
  I will use Example 5 to illustrate an imperfection in the expressive power of law to change behavior.
    Example 6: tax compliance--Most citizens in a nation comply with income tax laws, even though the probability
of prosecution for evasion is extremely low.
  Why do Americans and Swiss pay income taxes more scrupulously than Belgians or French?  I will use Example 6
to illustrate internalized social norms.
I What Are Social Norms?
  When constructing a new building in Rome, the builder confronts the detritus from centuries of human occupation.
Similarly, when constructing a theory of norms, a scholar confronts the detritus from centuries of philosophical
debate.  Unlike philosophy, social science makes models and predictions.  I approach social norms from the
viewpoint of social science, so exact definitions are unimportant to this paper.  I will, however, use some
philosophical concepts to clarify my subject.  An old tradition in Anglo- American jurisprudence, called the
"imperative theory of law," asserts that a law is an obligation backed by a state sanction. [FN8]  According to this
tradition, the law consists of statements such as, "You ought not to drive over seventy miles per hour, or else you
can be fined $500," or "You ought to take reasonable care toward your neighbors, or else you will be liable for the
harm that you cause them."
  *5 Following this tradition, a social norm is an obligation backed by a social sanction.  By "obligation" I mean a
statement about what people ought to do, such as pay taxes and clean up after their dogs.  By a social sanction, I
mean punishment imposed, not by state officials, but by ordinary people, such as shunning a litigious lawyer or
refusing to deal with a law firm that organizes hostile takeovers.
  In general, legal systems have primary rules that regulate the behavior of citizens and secondary rules that specify
the process for making, amending, or extinguishing primary laws.  To illustrate secondary rules, the U.S.
Constitution specifies that a bill becomes law when it receives a majority vote in both houses of Congress and the
signature of the President.  Similarly, many private organizations have charters that specify how to make rules.  To
illustrate private secondary rules, the charter of a corporation may empower its board of directors to impose rules on
employees, or the bylaws of a church may empower its deacons to impose rules on members.  In contrast, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) contains primary rules which specify how citizens must treat disabled
people.
  The least formal social norms, however, lack secondary rules.  To demonstrate, no definite process exists to create,
amend, or extinguish a rule of etiquette or a principle of morality.  The least formal social norms are the polar
opposite of state laws, which are the most formal norms.  In order to draw the sharpest contrast between law and
social norms, I will focus on the least formal social norms.  The sharp contrast between formal state law and
informal social norms helps to explain the relative advantages and disadvantages of law and morality as a means of
social control.
  When no definite process exists to create a norm, people often disagree about a norm's existence, especially in
times of social change.  For example, are Americans still obligated to hold the fork in the right hand when eating, or
is the European practice of holding the fork in the left hand now acceptable in America?  The controversy over what
norms exist, however, is mild compared to the controversy over what norms ought to exist.  This paper is not about
what norms exist or ought to exist.  The controversy in this paper concerns, not our obligations, but their
consequences.  Instead of engaging in controversy over what *6 people ought to do, I focus on how beliefs about
what people ought to do effect what they actually do.
II Demand, Supply, and Equilibrium
  Before turning to the three effects of social norms on law, I must first explain how to analyze social norms in terms
of demand, supply, and equilibrium. [FN9]  Obeying a norm often costs something in terms of money, time, effort,
unpleasantness, or risk.  To illustrate, complying with tax law costs money, cleaning up after a dog is unpleasant,
shunning someone can be risky, and forbearing from smoking may require effort.  A person who has internalized a
norm is willing to sacrifice something to obey it.  The vertical axis in Figure 1 represents the amount a person is
willing to pay to obey a social norm, and the horizontal axis represents the proportion of citizens willing to pay the
price.  According to the graph, a small number of people are willing to pay a lot and a large number of people are
willing to pay a little. Roughly 80% of the citizens will pay something to obey the norm, whereas roughly 20% will
pay nothing.
Figure 1: Willingness to Pay
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  *7 In economics, a person who is willing to pay to consume a good has a "taste" for the good.  Similarly, a person
who internalizes a social norm has a "taste" for obeying the norm.  This language, which misleads some people and
offends others, prompts many useful insights by connecting social norms to demand curves.  Figure 1 indicates that
roughly 80% of the population has a taste for obeying the norm.  To illustrate concretely, 80% of the population may
be willing to endure some unpleasantness to clean up after their dogs. These people presumably believe that they
ought to clean up after their dogs and this belief provides sufficient reason to pay a price for doing so.
  Besides consumers, merchants buy goods for resale and manufacturers buy goods for use in production.  Unlike
consumers, merchants and manufacturers need not have a taste for the goods they buy.  While consumption is
intrinsically valuable, resale and production are instrumentally valuable.  Consequently, the purchase of goods for
consumption is called "final demand," and the purchase of goods for resale or use in production is called "derived
demand."  Figure 1 depicts a situation where most people intrinsically value obeying a norm, whereas 20% of the
people place no intrinsic value on obeying a norm.  The 20% only obey the norm in so far as doing so has
instrumental value, which depends on the resulting advantages and disadvantages such as avoiding censure or
attracting preferential treatment.  To illustrate concretely, 20% of the population may be unwilling to endure
unpleasantness to clean up after their dogs unless they gain an offsetting advantage.  Later I will represent
instrumental value on a graph.
  Unlike the norm depicted in Figure 1, the only value that most people place on obeying some norms is
instrumental.  For example, most lawyers view participating or not participating in hostile takeovers as purely
instrumental.  In so far as participating makes more money for them, they will participate.  Conversely, they will not
participate if it loses money for them because established firms refuse to deal with them.  To represent people who
place little intrinsic value on the norm, the willingness-to-pay curve in Figure 1 would have to shift down.
  Having graphed the price that citizens are willing to pay to obey a norm, now I turn to the cost that they actually
have to pay.  Obeying a norm often imposes direct costs in money, foregone opportunity, inconvenience, or effort.
In addition, obeying *8 a norm often has instrumental value, such as obtaining praise, esteem, promotion, and
preferential dealings.  Obeying a norm also conveys the benefit of avoiding a social sanction.  To demonstrate, a
person who cleans up after his dog may have to endure unpleasantness, but may also avoid censure.
  The net cost of obeying a norm equals the direct costs minus the instrumental benefit.  Figure 2 depicts the net cost
of obeying a norm as a function of the proportion of people who obey it.  In general, net costs can increase or
decrease with the number of people who obey the norm.  Figure 2, however, depicts the specific case where costs
decrease with the number of people who obey the norm.  Costs can decrease because of indivisibilities in capital and
network effects, which are the usual causes of increasing returns to scale in production. [FN10]  For social norms,
however, costs of obeying a norm can also decrease for a sociological reason.  People are notoriously susceptible to
group pressures, which are variously described as conformity, herd effects, or social solidarity.  Group pressures
often lower the relative cost of popular acts.  To illustrate, as fewer people smoke in airports, non-smokers may
become more aggressive toward smokers, so the relative cost of forbearing from smoking decreases.  Similarly, as
fewer lawyers participate in hostile takeovers, those who do presumably suffer more from boycotts by established
firms.  The expected cost curve slopes down where the costs borne by each actor who obeys the norm decrease as
more actors obey the norm.  Figure 2 illustrates this point.
*9 Figure 2: Net Cost
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  I want to combine the two curves in Figures 1 and 2.  To reduce the number of graphs, I have drawn shapes for the
curves in Figure 3 that capture the most interesting possibilities.  Where the two curves intersect, the cost of doing
the civic act equals the price people are willing to pay, so the system is in equilibrium.  Intersections of the curves
cause equilibria in Figure 3 at roughly 20% and 50%.  Later I explain the "corner" equilibrium at 0% where the
curves do not intersect.
Figure 3: Equilibria
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  *10 Now, consider the direction of movement when the system is out of equilibrium.  If the willingness-to-pay
curve is above the expected cost curve, more people are willing to do the act than required to sustain the current cost
of doing it, so the cost is decreasing.  To illustrate, in the interval between 20% and 50%, the cost is decreasing as
indicated by the arrow in Figure 3. Conversely, where the cost curve is above the willingness-to-pay curve, fewer
people are willing to do the act than are required to sustain the current cost of doing it, so the cost is increasing.  For
example, in the interval between 50% and 100%, the cost is increasing as indicated by the arrow.  Similarly, in the
interval between 0% and 20%, the cost is increasing as indicated by the arrow.
  As indicated by the arrows in Figure 3, starting from any point below 20%, the system tends to move to 0%, and
starting from any point above 20%, the system tends to move to 50%.  Thus, 0% and 50% are the stable equilibria of
the system depicted in Figure 3.
III Expression And Cheap Talk
  Having built the analytical foundation, now I turn to the three effects of social norms on law, beginning with the
expressive effect.  What determines whether the system depicted in Figure 3 settles into the equilibrium at 0% or
50%?  If everyone believes that less than 20% of the citizens will obey the norm, then their belief will prove correct
and the system will converge to the equilibrium at 0%.  Conversely, if everyone believes that more than 20% of the
citizens will obey the norm, then their belief will prove correct and the system will converge to the equilibrium at
50%.  Thus, the system has characteristics of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
  Given this fact, the law, by influencing people's beliefs about what others will do, might play a crucial role in
determining the outcome.  For example, assume the state wants citizens to obey the social norm.  If the state is
careful about its pronouncements, so that most citizens believe them, then the state might cause the system to
converge to the equilibrium at 50% merely by making the appropriate pronouncement.
  Berkeley's dog ordinance illustrates how states, through lawmaking, can influence norms.  After the Berkeley town
council *11 enacted an ordinance requiring owners to clean up after their dogs the sidewalks became much cleaner,
even though officials never issued citations for breaking the law. The law apparently tipped the balance in favor of
informal enforcement. Citizens became more aggressive about complaining to inconsiderate dog owners, and,
anticipating this fact, dog owners became more considerate.  In terms of Figure 3, enacting the ordinance caused a
jump in obedience to the norm from 0% to 50% or more.
  Similarly, when signs prohibiting smoking were posted in American airports, compliance with the rule became
almost perfect even though officials apparently never enforced it.  Proclaiming the rule tipped the balance in favor of
informal enforcement by citizens.  In other countries, such as France, however, prohibitions against smoking are
often flouted, much like Americans flouted the prohibition on consumption of alcohol in the 1930s.  The difference
between France and the United States presumably results from different levels of internalization of the social norm
restricting smoking.
  In general, social interactions can have multiple equilibria whenever the net cost of obeying a norm decreases with
the number of obedient people.  A credible state can influence the choice of multiple equilibria among citizens by
pronouncing the law.  The expressive power of the law derives from pre- existing multiple equilibria in the
underlying system of social interactions. These ideas, which I have developed elsewhere, [FN11] could revive older
theories of expressive law by providing them with an analytical basis. [FN12]
  Next I consider how pronouncements by state officials influence citizens.  To predict the success or failure of
pronouncements, a theory of expressive law needs the concept of "cheap *12 talk." [FN13]  The distinction between
cheap and expensive talk, which has not yet worked its way into the economic analysis of law, turns on the
difference between incentives and expectations. Expensive talk, such as contracting, disclosing, or distorting,
changes the schedule of payoffs attached to different actions.  To illustrate, breach of contract triggers damages,
inaccurate disclosure risks liability, and extortion provokes criminal punishment.
  Cheap talk, in contrast, does not change the schedule of payoffs.  Instead, under certain circumstances, cheap talk
changes expectations.  How can cheap talk change expectations without changing the schedule of payoffs?  If it is in
my best interest to reveal my true plans to you, then you have reason to believe my pronouncements about my plans.
Under these circumstances, you should believe what I say, even though my saying it does not affect my legal
liabilities or otherwise change my schedule of payoffs.  Stated more formally, cheap talk is credible under the
following condition: For all x, if I plan to do x, then I want you to believe that I will do x. [FN14]
  For instance, assume that I want to meet you in New York City.  If I plan to go to the Empire State Building, then I
want you to believe that I plan to go there, and I do not want you to believe that I plan to go to Grand Central
Station.  Conversely, if I plan to go Grand Central Station, then I want you to believe that I plan to go there, and I do
not want you to believe that I plan to go to the Empire State Building.  Since I want you to believe that I will do
what I plan to do, my talk with you about my plans is credible.
  Figure 4 depicts abstractly the payoffs in a game where cheap talk is credible.  I form a plan to do x or y, and you
form a belief about what I plan to do.  The cells "+" or "-" indicate my payoffs.  As reflected by the figure, my
payoff is positive when your belief about my plan is correct, and my payoff is negative when your belief about my
plan is incorrect.  In Figure 4, I want you to know my true plans because my payoff increases when we coordinate
our behavior, and my payoff decreases when we fail to coordinate.
*13 Figure 4: Credible Cheap Talk
          your belief about what I plan to do
my plan          x                   y
      x          +                   -
      y          -                   +
  
  The conditions for credible cheap talk apply to everyone, including government officials.  If government officials
plan to do something, and the payoff to officials is highest when citizens have correct beliefs about official plans,
then the official pronouncement is credible.  A good political leader uses cheap talk to change the behavior of
citizens.  To demonstrate via Figure 3, assume the leader announces plans to increase dramatically the percentage of
citizens who obey the social norm.  If at least 20% of the citizens believe that the leader has such a plan that will
succeed, then they will begin to obey the norm, which will cause 30% more of the citizens to follow their example,
and the system will ascend to the equilibrium where 50% do their duty.  The success of the leader's plan will
increase his credibility among citizens.
  Like this leader, officials in an effective state announce plans that will work and avoid announcing plans that will
fail.  For example, officials should wait to announce that they plan to eliminate smoking in airports until social
conditions are right for the plan to succeed.
  Conversely, if politicians manipulate people by announcing unrealistic plans, citizens will believe that the officials
are really planning something else. Rearranging the payoffs in Figure 4 can change the coordination game into a
game of perfect deceit, where I always want you to believe the opposite from my true plans. [FN15]  Or, rearranging
the payoffs can produce a game of imperfect deceit, where I sometimes want you to believe the opposite*14 from
my true plans. [FN16]  In either of these cases, cheap talk is ineffective.
  Compared to cheap talk, expensive talk is formal, legalistic, and clumsy.  Consequently, expensive talk has higher
transaction costs than cheap talk.  The state that creates incentives for effective cheap talk between officials and
citizens saves transaction costs.  Effective cheap talk uses law expressively. In general, the expressive function of
law works best when state officials enjoy credibility.
  Credible talk complements the ideal of public reason as elucidated by John Rawls in Political Liberalism. [FN17]
The ideal of public reason concerns the conditions of political discourse in a liberal democracy.  In a liberal
democracy, officials ideally give the true reasons for public policies.  Candor promotes public debate and makes
democratic deliberation meaningful.  If the incentives of officials have the form depicted in Figure 4, then officials
have reason to disclose the truth and citizens have reason to believe what officials say.  Thus, arranging incentives of
officials to make cheap talk credible promotes the ideal of public reason.
  Economists have devoted much effort to designing "incentive compatible mechanisms" for the supply of public
goods. [FN18]  To my knowledge, however, no research focuses on mechanisms to induce public officials to
disclose their true plans. [FN19]  The theory of cheap talk provides the foundation for designing mechanisms to
induce public officials to disclose their true plans.  Such mechanisms would create incentives for officials whose
form corresponds to Figure 4.  Although I have no such mechanisms to *15 offer in his paper, I will discuss later
the relationship between credible talk and the branches of government.
V Deterrence
  Having discussed expression, I turn to the deterrence of wrongdoing.  As already discussed, the imperative theory
defines a law as an obligation backed by a sanction. [FN20]  When law aligns with social norms, the law can use
state sanctions to supplement social sanctions.  For example, fines can supplement the shame associated with being a
tax cheater.  Supplementing the social sanction with a legal sanction increases the total sanction.  An increase in the
total sanction from disobeying a norm is equivalent to a decrease in the relative cost of obeying the norm.  In terms
of the net cost curve in Figure 2, a sanction decreases the net cost of obeying a norm.  Assume that state law attaches
a legal sanction to supplement a social norm's non- legal sanction.  To depict this change graphically, Figure 5
shows a downward shift in the net cost curve.
Figure 5: Deterrence--More Severe Sanction for Disobedience, or Lower Net Cost
of Obedience
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  *16 This change has two consequences. First, the tipping point at 20% moves down approximately to 15%, so the
system can tip more easily from low to high obedience of the norm. Specifically, if obedience is initially at 0%, then
obedience must increase to 15% to jump to a high level of obedience.  Before the imposition of the legal sanction,
obedience had to increase to 20% to jump to a high level of obedience.  Thus, the legal sanction makes legal
expression more likely to cause a jump in behavior.
  Second, the stable equilibrium at 50% moves up to approximately 65%, which has two possible consequences.  If
the system is initially at the equilibrium at 50%, the shift in the cost curve causes the system to move to the new
equilibrium at 65%.  This is a relatively small change in behavior.  In sum, adding state sanctions to social sanctions
has one of two possible effects on the targeted behavior: either a small change for certain or a higher probability of a
large jump.
  Combining state sanctions and social sanctions raises questions about their interaction.  Recall the facts in Example
3, where defendant's negligence caused a loss of $100 to the plaintiff without harming anyone else, and a court
decision holding the defendant liable will provoke a citizens' boycott that costs the defendant $25.  While the
defendant loses $25, I assume that the increase in trade to his competitors causes them to gain $25.  Should the court
award damages of $100, or should the courtanticipate the social sanction and reduce the judgment to $75?  I will
briefly sketch the answer given in a work in progress with Ariel Porat. [FN21]
  The goal of deterrence typically requires the injurer to internalize the harm that he caused.  In this example, the
injurer caused harm of $100.  In the absence of a social sanction, a judgment of $100 forces the injurer to internalize
the harm that he caused.  In the presence of a social sanction of $25 and a legal judgment of $100, however, the
injurer will internalize more than the social cost of the harm that he caused.  To internalize exactly the social cost of
the harm that he caused, the injurer who faced a social sanction of $25 should pay a legal judgment of $75.
  The critical assumption for this result is that the defendant's loss of $25 from the boycott causes an increase in trade
of $25 to *17 his competitors. In other words, the social sanction transfers value.  Alternatively, the social sanction
might destroy value.  For example, the boycott might cause the injurer to lose $25 without increasing trade for his
competitors.  Under this assumption, the injurer causes $100 of harm to others and $25 to himself, for a total social
cost of $125.  To internalize exactly the social cost of the harm that he caused, the injurer who pays a social sanction
of $25 should pay damages of $100.  In general, efficient deterrence requires damages equal to the harm the injurer
causes to others minus any value transferred by a social sanction from the injurer to others.
VI Internalization
  So far I have discussed the expressive and deterrence effects of social norms on law.  Now I turn to internalization.
  To begin, assume that law causes internalization and consider its effects.  Whereas deterrence shifts the cost curve,
internalization shifts the willingness-to-pay curve.  To depict this change graphically, Figure 6 shows an upward
shift in willingness to pay to obey the norm.  As a consequence of this shift, the tipping point at 20% moves down to
approximately 15%.  Thus, the system will converge to 0% from any point below 15%.  Similarly, when the stable
equilibrium at 50% moves up to approximately 65%, the system will converge to 65% from any point above 15%.
Figure 6: Internalization
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  *18 Notice that I chose numbers in Figure 6 so that more internalization has the identical effects as lower net costs
in Figure 5.  If the system is initially at the equilibrium at 50%, the change in individual values causes the system to
move to 65%, which is a small change.  Alternatively, if the system is initially at the equilibrium at 0%, then the
system requires a shock of 15% to trigger a large jump in behavior that converges to the equilibrium at 65%. As
with deterrence, internalization of values has one of two possible effects on the targeted behavior: either a small
change for certain or a higher probability of a large jump.
  I have explained that economics can comprehend the internalization of values by assuming a "taste" for obeying
social norms.  Postulating different tastes among people, however, accomplishes little in the absence of an
explanation of why some people have such tastes and others do not.  Economic theory is only beginning a sustained
inquiry into the question, "Where do preferences come from?" [FN22]  I will briefly sketch an answer to this
question as applied to social norms, which I have developed elsewhere at greater length. [FN23]
  Business, politics, love, and war cause people to form relationships *19 with each other.  These relationships create
both opportunities for mutual benefit from cooperation and opportunities for people to exploit each other.  People,
consequently, care about their partners' trustworthiness.  People have more trust in a morally committed person, who
will sacrifice to do the right thing. [FN24]
  I have explained why people often prefer partners who have internalized morality.  To act on this preference,
people must observe the moral commitments of others.  The moral commitments of strangers are opaque, but, as
people get to know each other better, their moral commitments become translucent.  Given that moral commitments
are translucent and people care about the moral commitments of their partners, moral commitments affect
opportunities.  To illustrate, if employers have some insight into the traits of employees, and if most employers
prefer honest employees, then, on average, an honest person will enjoy more employment opportunities than a
dishonest person.
  The dependence of opportunities on preferences gives a person an incentive to change his preferences.  To
illustrate, if a dishonest youth wants more opportunities for employment, he might become honest.  My theory
predicts that people will tend to make moral commitments when doing so causes a sufficiently large increase in their
opportunities.  How large is "sufficiently large?"  I have tried to answer this question elsewhere by focusing on
changes that leave the decision-maker better off with respect to his original preferences and his final preferences
("Pareto self-improvement"). [FN25]  For purposes of this paper, however, I focus on the consequences of these
general ideas for law.
  If people tend to make moral commitments to increase their opportunities, then the state has only limited power to
cause citizens to internalize values. To induce people to internalize values, the state must reward citizens for having
civic virtue.  For this purpose, officials bestow honors, awards, and praise, as well as their opposites (dishonor,
punishments, and condemnations). To reward people for having civic virtue, however, the state must *20 infer
character from behavior.  Inferring character from behavior requires intimate knowledge of the person.  Since
officials in large states are remote from most citizens, the character of each citizen is relatively opaque to state
officials.  Consequently, officials lack the information needed to reward people for acquiring civic virtue.
  Compared to the state, people in intimate relationships with each other are relatively good at inferring character
from behavior.  Consequently, the primary influences on character are intimate relationships such as families,
friends, and colleagues.  Given these facts, the state will have limited success instilling civic virtue in citizens.
Instead, the state should prompt family, friends, and colleagues to instill civic virtue in each other.  In so far as
family, friends, and colleagues prefer relationships with civic-minded people, individuals have an incentive to
cultivate civic virtue.  The primary way to prompt people to instill civic virtue in each other is by aligning law with
morality.  When law aligns with morality, individuals who cultivate morality necessarily acquire civic virtue.
Consequently, the law enlists the force of internalized morality to achieve the ends of the state.
VII Interaction Effects
  Having distinguished expression, deterrence, and internalization, I will briefly explain how they interact when
promulgating a law.  Promulgating a law often involves proclaiming a new obligation, describing the sanction
attached to its violation, and providing reasons for enacting it.  The first row of Table 1 lists these three parts of a
law.  These parts relate especially (but not uniquely) to the three effects of social norms on law that I explained.
Proclaiming a legal obligation gives people instructions on what to do, which principally promotes the coordination
of behavior.  Attaching a sanction to an obligation specially deters its violation.  Explaining the law ideally
convinces citizens to follow it.  In brief, the three aspects of promulgating a law chiefly aim at expression,
deterrence, and internalization, as indicated in the second row of Table 1.
*21 Table 1: Consequences of a Law's Promulgation
   Law's parts      obligation   sanction     explanation
Law's consequences  expression  deterrence  internalization
  
  Laws that have all three parts potentially have all three consequences.  To illustrate, consider promulgating a law
prohibiting a particular pollutant. The new law's pronouncement may make polluters expect that others will abate. If
more abatement increases the social pressure on polluters, then the change in expectations might cause a jump to a
new equilibrium (expressive effect). In addition, when the state attaches a sanction to polluting, some polluters will
abate to avoid the sanction (deterrence effect).  Finally, the legal explanation for this new obligation may convince
some people to change their values and prefer to abate (internalization effect).
Conclusion
  Law and social norms have complementary strengths as means of social control.  First, informal social norms are
vague, general principles.  To illustrate, social norms are imprecise about the obligations that smokers owe to non-
smokers or the appropriate sanction for a tax cheater.  The promulgation of a law often transforms a vague principle
with an imprecise sanction into an explicit obligation with a definite sanction.  Second, citizens use all available
information, including gossip and rumor, when applying informal social sanctions, whereas officials apply sanctions
after a trial or hearing that follows prescribed rules of evidence.  Third, compared to social norms, law can impose
heavier punishments, whose application involves more risk to the enforcer.  To illustrate, many people will complain
about someone lighting a cigarette in an airport, but few citizens will intervene to prevent an armed robbery.
Similarly, the law prohibits private citizens from imprisoning robbers.
  Which is better, a vague formulation of an obligation and sanction combined with a subjective determination of
wrongdoing and enforcement by public citizens, or an authoritative formulation of an obligation and sanction
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